Review: \u27States of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship in The Russian Empire and Early Soviet Republic\u27 by Darrow, David W.
University of Dayton
eCommons
History Faculty Publications Department of History
2015
Review: 'States of Obligation: Taxes and
Citizenship in The Russian Empire and Early Soviet
Republic'
David W. Darrow
University of Dayton, ddarrow1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/hst_fac_pub
Part of the History Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Darrow, David W., "Review: 'States of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship in The Russian Empire and Early Soviet Republic'" (2015).
History Faculty Publications. 62.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/hst_fac_pub/62
 1 
Yanni Kotsonis,  States of Obligation:  Taxes and Citizenship in The Russian Empire 
and Early Soviet Republic.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.  Pp. XIX + 
483; Illustrations.  Notes.  Index. £XX (hardback).  ISBN 978 1 4426 4354 3 
 
 Many have portrayed death and taxes as life’s only certainties.  Kotsonis’ 
book masterfully disrupts many of our certainties about Russian history by 
examining taxation as a nexus of key categories (state, economy, and people), and 
the role taxation played in the mutually constitutive processes whereby the modern 
state, the modern economy, and the modern population came into existence.  In 
Russia, perhaps even more than in other states, ‘new kinds of taxes helped define 
[create] these categories, introduced a fundamental duality to each of them, and put 
each in tension with the others’ (8).  The modern imperial state thrived on these 
dualities (particularly those involving personhood) and the new Bolshevik regime 
attempted to eliminate them once and for all (thereby acting as a truly new regime 
built upon the foundation prepared by the fiscal practices of the old). 
Readers will be surprised at the extent to which an empire built on 
particularisms actively pursued the same universalist agenda found in other states, 
and at the extent to which, at least in terms of the non-peasant population, the 
Russian state was neither under-governed nor radically different from its more 
representational peers.  In the end, the bountiful and meticulously presented 
evidence of the intent with which the autocracy created the society it sought to 
govern in a program of tax reform makes Lenin’s State and Revolution seem rather 
well rooted in the actual lived experience of pre-revolutionary urban society.  
Taxation brought all non-peasants into the state and acculturated them to 
participation—not as representatives, but as citizens nonetheless. 
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Chapters 1-2 lay out the comparative intellectual background and outlines of 
the process by which Russian state and society mutually constituted each other in 
the process of taxation.  From avoiding direct contact with the payer in the 1860s 
and 1870s (mostly because it lacked the information to do so), the state shifted 
toward direct taxation of individuals in the 1880s.  Chapters 3-6 detail the 
implementation of direct taxes that transcended the payer’s old regime estate 
identity by avoiding the person and ultimately changed the system from the 
apportioned taxation of aggregates and collectives to the calculated and 
proportional taxation of non-peasant individuals.  Taxes on land, commercial 
registrations and transactions, inheritance, and urban real estate leveraged the 
state’s position as guarantor of contracts and creator of juridical corporate persons 
to induce financial transparency and discipline the population, making the payment 
of taxes and participation in mutual surveillance a mark of citizenship.  Taxes that 
initially yielded modest sums became major sources of state revenue by 1913 
because of the wealth of economic information they generated.  One merchant’s 
declared exemption revealed another’s income.  Small registration fees revealed 
sources of other, greater, revenue.  One apartment dweller’s rent indicated the 
potential income of others in the building. What began with the creation of a tax 
inspectorate and urban tax commissions in 1885 paved the way for the discussion 
and ultimate introduction of personal income taxes after 1905. 
The appeal of the income tax after the 1905 crisis, and its enactment in 1916, 
is key to the book’s main premise that the state consciously used tax policy to create 
the citizens it sought to govern and incorporate them into the state.  After the 1905’s 
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violence, experts and officials presented the progressive personal income tax as a 
tool of socio-political cohesion and stability—an equality of inclusive citizenship 
within the state that avoided the thorny question of representation by offering 
social justice through its universality.  This rendered even parliamentary Britain and 
autocratic Russia much alike, as states everywhere defined citizenship in terms of 
fiscal obligations and opened up the final assault of this new civic nation on the last 
remnants of the old regime found in the wealth of the British peerage, Prussian 
Junkers, and the Romanov family itself (except for the emperor).  Against the 
background of revolution, propertied classes saw in the income tax a new means for 
the state to guarantee the safety of their person and property by schooling the mob 
in civilized state participation, while those on the left saw it as a milestone of civic 
inclusion for their constituents.  After 1905 the income tax, like the state statistics 
that helped make it possible, offered the possibility of social and political stability 
through inclusion in a society of equivalent and measureable individuals (199).  War 
added fiscal necessity to the appeal of stability after 1914. 
Chapters 7-9 relate to taxing the peasantry, or rather dealing with the 
majority of the population that the state never managed to include and mobilize by 
fiscal means.  Peasant taxation was never direct, let alone proportional, and the 
excise tax gleaned from the production and sale of vodka embroiled the state in 
moral questions connected to public health that cast it as a villain in the public eye.  
While the taxation of all others had evolved into a modern relationship with and 
within the state in which taxes were more and more direct and progressive, peasant 
taxation remained estate based, apportioned, and repartitional, with peasants taxed 
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as aggregates and collectives instead of as individuals.  The state assessed taxes 
based on limited information and remained little concerned with how the bills were 
allocated to and within peasant communities and households. This exacerbated the 
division between peasant and non-peasant Russia into something more profound 
than the nobility’s preference for French over Russian in polite conversation or even 
income differences.  Non-peasants were brought into the state, while peasants were 
not.  For non-peasants taxes were unavoidable and a mark of citizenship enforced 
by acculturated discipline, peer pressure and the threat of state coercion.  For 
peasants, taxes were easily avoided, as evidenced by the whole question of arrears 
(which were built into the system), and ‘coercive to the core,’ (244) in that they 
were arbitrarily enforced by confiscations and beatings.  From this perspective, 
confiscation and beating came to represent the state’s most direct relationship with 
the individual peasant. 
Furthermore, even though peasant taxes had been reduced to a minuscule 
portion of overall state revenue by 1913 (2% or less) as the state shifted its 
attention to the more transparent and vibrant commercial economy, simply 
abolishing taxes on peasants was impossible because it would mean cutting the only 
primary connection peasants had to the state (244).  The great success that the state 
achieved in making state and non-peasant society mutually constitutive was 
accompanied by colossal failure in relation to the empire’s peasant majority.  After 
1914, there began a steady and constant collision between an ‘urban system of 
discipline, individuation, and inescapability’ and a peasant society whose 
relationship with the state was still rooted in ‘collectivism, apportioned bills, and 
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evasion’ that thus ‘placed a high political and civic expectation on a peasant 
population that had never been prepared for anything other than obscurity and 
shirking’ (23).  This was real under-government. 
The concluding chapters (10-12) follow the story of taxation and citizenship 
into the new Soviet regime.  Primed with a population already acculturated to state 
economic activism, abundant statist-minded experts, and a model of taxation as an 
instrument of civic inclusion, the Soviets initially tried to complete the imperial 
state’s project by extending the universalism of income taxation to the peasantry full 
scale.  The Bolsheviks’ relationship with the peasantry was thus an encounter 
between the type of citizenship constructed for non-peasants under autocracy (a 
universalism they embraced) and the peasants previously excluded. Peasants 
responding with typical evasion encountered a state more willing to use coercion to 
ensure its own survival. This was War Communism.  In the end, peasants sent the 
Bolsheviks back to the same starting point as their predecessors, as the NEP 
introduced a number of smaller assessments, such as licensure fees, designed as 
much to collect information about peasant income and draw the rural population 
into state activity as they were to secure revenue. 
This dense work is obligatory reading for specialists and their graduate 
students.  It opens the door to new questions related to the means by which state, 
population, and economy intersect in Russia and elsewhere.  The author and press 
are to be congratulated for blessing us with these intellectual provocations. 
David W. Darrow 
University of Dayton 
